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CORPORATE PAYMENTS TO STOCKHOLDERS AND'
EMPLOYEES UNDER THE REVENUE ACT OF 1950
LEO A. DIAMOND*
For a number of years it has become virtually commonplace that fed-
eral revenue laws, required under the Constitution of the United States to
originate in the House of Representatives, are nearly always enacted sub-
stantially as rewritten in the Senate. The Revenue Act of 1950 2-the
twenty-fifth major revenue revision since the enactment of the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913-is the most recent outstanding and surprising example
of the vagaries of the federal legislative process. Introduced on June 22,
1950, with administration support as a bill primarily to reduce excises, the
Revenue Act of 1950, enacted only three months later on September 23,
1950, wiped out all excise tax reductions proposed by the House of Repre-
sentatives and substantially increased individual and corporation income tax
liabilities. The shift in legislative approach between June and September
of 1950 was due entirely to sudden adverse international developments, es-
pecially those arising out of the Korean crisis. That crisis had so developed
into a threat to the maintenance of world peace that enactment of a bill to
reduce excises would have been sheer folly. It is not startling, therefore,
that when the Senate version of the Revenue Act of 1950 was introduced
on August 22, 1950, the measure was no longer one to reduce excises but,
on the contrary, was one to provide substantial additional revenue for the
costs of military action in Korea and related dcfense expenditures. Great
as was the popular support for repeal or reduction of most excises left over
from World War II, 4 there was no major opposition to postponement of
such repeal or reduction or to the increase in income tax liabilities of both
individuals and corporations.
The enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950 constituted a solemn and
unmistakable warning that more and heavier tax burdens were to be im-
posed. That warning was to be found not only in the circumstances which
*J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1929; former Special Assistant to the Chief
Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; member of the bars of New York, Illinois
and Indiana.
1. U.S. CorsT. Art. I, § 7.
2. Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 994 (Sept. 23, 1950); 64 STAT. 906.
3. H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
4. In his statement of February 5, 1951, before the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives, Secretary of the Treasury Snyder said the following:
I know the Committee has special reason to regret the necessity for this
action [i.e., of increasing excise taxes]. Only a year ago you were considering the
President's recommendation for excise tax reductions. This reversal of the situation
is one more measure of the price we must pay for our defense requirements,
5. On the contrary, newspaper and editorial comment generally was surprisingly
favorable to delay in excise tax reduction. This is significant since many of these same
sources of public opinion were virtually uniformly in favor, in June, 1950, of immediate
and substantial excise tax reduction.
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gave rise to the final version of the enacted measure but also in a specific
mandate contained therein that the Congress was to consider the enact-
ment of an excess profits tax.0 That tax has now been imposed by the
enactment of the Excess Profits Tax Act of 19501 through the acceleration
of the legislative process which surprised everyone, including the legislators
themselves. In his Budget message of January 15, 1951, President Truman
requested the imposition of further taxes to help produce a budget of $71
billions for the fiscal year 1952.8 In 1951 there will undoubtedly be a new
revenue law embodying a substantial part, if not all, of the presidential rec-
omnendation.
To the extent that schedules of tax rates provided for by the Revenue
Act of 1950 have already been superseded by subsequent legislation, that
Act will have become of historical interest in a surprisingly short period of
time. The Revenue Act of 1950 contains in addition, however, many signifi-
cant changes in substantive provisions which will undoubtedly become
permanent features in the administration of federal income tax laws.10
Some of the changes were made to remove tax deterrents from otherwise
orderly sales and liquidations," whereas others were effected to prevent
6. Title VII of the Revenue Act of 1950 reads as follows:
§ 701. Excess Profits Tax(a) The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee
on Finance are hereby directed to report to the respective Houses of Congress a
bill for raising revenue by the levying, collection, and payment of corporate excess
profits taxes with retroactive effect to October 1, or July 1, 1950. said bill to
originate as required by article I, section 7, of the Constitution. Said bill shall be
reported as early as practicable during the Eighty-first Congress after November 15,
1950, if the Congress is in session in 1950 after such date; and if the Congress is
not in session in 1950 after November 15, 1950, said bill shall be reported during
the first session of the Eighty-second Congress, and as early as practicable during
said session.(b) The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, or any duly author-
ized subcommittee thereof, is hereby authorized and directed to make a full and
complete study of the problems involved in the taxation of excess profits accruing
to corporations as the result of the national defense program in which the United
States is now engaged. The joint committee shall report the results of its study
to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on
Finance s's soon as pract;cable.
Until H.R. 9827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. was introduced on December 2, 1950 as a
bill to impose a corporate excess profits tax, there was great uncertainty whether the
mandate of Section 701 of the Revenue Act of 1950 would be obeyed by the Congress.
Considerable controversy raged in the press and in hearings before the Committee on Ways
and Means as to the scope of such mandate, there being much argument, that enactment
of an excess profits tax was not automatically and inevitably required. Enactment of the
Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950 stilled all such argument.
7. Pub. L. No. 909, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1199 (Jan. 3, 1951.)
8. Daily Report for Executives, January 15, 1951, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
Washington, D. C.
9. In March, 1951, it is not certain whether all of the $10 billion increase in taxes
requested by the President will be voted by the Congress. International tensions may
again be the determining factor.
10. See e.g,, Title III of the Act, "Treatment of income of, and gifts and bequests
to, certain tax exempt organizations," accentuated by business activities described in Cary,
Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and
Policy Considerations, 62 HaV. L. Rev. 1 (1948); Cf. C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 14
T.C. 922 (1950), on taxpayer's appeal to Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit.
11. E.g., [NT. REV. CODE § 207, amending § 112(b) (7) (liquidations); INTr. Rev.
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the draining off of revenue through various forms of tax saving schemes
and devices.' 2 Consequently, that Act, as a major legislative expansion of
federal income tax concepts, will be of lasting importance, despite succeed-
ing revenue enactments. This paper is limited to a summary analysis of
some of the more important of such changes, dealing with corporate dis-
tributions and stock options to employees.
1. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
Dividends-Received Credit
Corporations, both foreign and domestic, have been permitted for
many years a dividends-received credit of 85% of dividends received from
domestic corporations but not in excess of 85% of the recipient's adjusted
net income. 3 The dividends-received credit was founded on congressional
policy to refrain from taxing, at least in part, as income to the recipient
corporation dividends received from domestic corporations-a form of relief
from so-called double taxation of corporate earnings. 14 Permitted originally
as a tax-relieving measure, the dividends-received credit was found, however,
to open up a loophole,' resulting in clearly unjustified tax advantages in
the case of certain distributions of property other than cash.
For example, if Corporation A, owning stock in Corporation B, received
a cash dividend from B, no problem of tax avoidance is involved if A is
pcrmitted a dividends-received credit of 85% of the cash distribution, sub-
ConE § 209. adding $ llS(g) (3) (redemption to pay death taxes): TNTr. REv. CODE
§ 210, amending $ 117(a) (capital gain treatment of artistic property); INrr. REv. CODE
§ 216. adding § 124A (amortization of war facilities).
12. E.g., INT. Riv. CODE § 208, adding § 115(g) (2) (redemption of stock by con-
trolled company); lNT. REv. CODE § 217, amending § 125 (amortization of premium on
convertible bond); IxT. R ev. CODE § 211, amending § 117 (short sales of capital assets)-
INT. REV. CODE § 212, amending § 117 (treatment of gain to shareholders of collapsible
corporations); TNT. REV. CODE § 213, amending § 211 (capital gains of nonresident
aliens).
13. Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1921 and continuing through the Revenue
Act of 1934, dividends received by a corporation from a domestic corporation were de-
ductible in full from cross income. Section 234(a) (6), Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924.
1926: Section 23(p), Revenue Acts of 1928, 1932, 1934. Beginning with the Revenue
Act of 1936 and continuing down to date, the full deduction was disallowed and an 85%
credit snbstituted. See INT. REv. Cort: § 26(b), before amendment by Section 122(a)
of the Revenue Act of 1950 discussed infra. The credit is not available with respect to
dividends received from so-called China Trade Act Corporations or Section 251 corpora-
tions.
14. The shift from deduction to credit was occasioned in the Revenue Act of 1936
because of the imposition by that Act of the short-lived surtax on undistributed profits
tax. Pub. L. No. 740, 74th Cong. The credit for dividends received was available only
against normal tax and not against such surtax, there being no other ordinary corporate
surtax. SN. FIN. CoMM. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), at p. 15. The
credit has been available against corporation surtax since 1941. Section 104, Revenue Act
of 1941, Pub. L. 250, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 412.
15. "The term 'loophole,' although widely used in polemic discussions of tax statutes
and in the more scholarly treatments of tax subjects, is often employed rather loosely. In
its narrower and primary meaning, it is used to denote tax savings which the legislative
body enacting the statute did not realize would be made possible by the law. At times the
term apparently refers also to special tax advantages available to limited groups which
the legislative body intended to confer or permit. In its broader meaning, the term seems
to connote absence of justification." Lyon, Employee Stock Options, 51 COL. L. REV.
1, 3, n. 3 (1951).
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ject to the limitation of 85% of its own adjusted net income. If, however,
A were to receive property other than cash, tax avoidance may result if the
property has appreciated substantially between the time it was acquired by
Corporation B and the time it was received by Corporation A." Under the
Internal Revenue Code, 17 a dividend is to be taken into the income of the
recipient at its fair market value. Thus, Corporation B, receiving a dividend
in kind would be required to report as gross income the fair market value
of such dividend and presumably would be entitled to use that fair market
value as its own tax basis in determining gain or loss on subsequent dis-
position or in determining depreciation or depletion allowances. At the
same time, it would be permitted to enjoy the benefits of a dividends-receiv-
ed credit on the amount of the fair market value of the dividend in kind.
In the case of a parent and subsidiary relationship, there thus could be
opened a substantial avenue of tax avoidance in that the subsidiary could
distribute a dividend in kind to the parent and the parent could subsequent-
ly dispose of it with no more than a tax on 15% of the value of such divi-
dend, notwithstanding that the economic gain may have been greatly in
excess of 15% of the fair market value of such dividend in kind.
The existence of the loophole was known, of course, for many years
but, for one reason or another, there was insufficient momentum prior to
19501' to obtain enactment for a correction of the situation. Such momen-
turn, apparently at the insistence of the Treasury Department, was developed
in the consideration of the Revenue Act of 1950 to close the possible loop-
holes of distributions in kind. Under Section 26(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code, as presently amended,'0 the dividends-received credit, in the case of
a dividend in property other than money, is limited to 85% of the adjusted
basis of that property in the hands of the distributing corporation. increased
in the amount of any gain or decreased in the amount of any loss recog-
nized to the distributing corporation by virtue of such distribution. A
16. See Section 120, Il.R. 6712, Revenue Revision Bill of 1948 (unenacted); H.IR.
VAYS AND MEANS COMM. RE.P. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), Item No. 18.p. 22.17. Section 115(j) requires that if all or a "part" of a dividend is paid to a share-
holder in any medium other than money, the property received other than money shall
be included in gross income at its fair market value at the time as of which it becomes
income to the shareholder. A dividend "becomes income to the shareholder" when it is
received (actually or constructively) by the shareholder, irrespective of the method of
reporting income used by the recipient. American Light & Traction Co. v. Comm'r, 3
T.C. 1048, aff'd, 156 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1946); Tar Products Corp. v. Comm'r, 130
F.2d 866, (3rd Cir. 1942).
18. Actually, in the unenacted Revenue Revision Bill of 1948, (see n.16) the first
move was made legislatively to plug the loophole.
19. Revenue Act of 1950, § 122(a). '[he textual discussion is limited to dividends
received from domestic corporations generally. The Revenue Act of 1950 added dividends-
received on preferred stock of public utilities subject to federal income tax. The credit
is 5796% for the calendar year 1950 and 59% for any taxable year beginning-on July 1, 1950,
and thereafter. The public utility must come within the definition found in Section
26(h) (1) and the preferred stock must be of the kind and amount described in Section
26(h) (2). The limitation on the credit for dividends in kind applies also to distributions
on public utility preferred stock; as a practical matter, such distributions in kind would
rarely, if at all, be made in the case of public utility preferred stock dividends.
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further limitation is imposed so that the dividends-received credit cannot
exceed 85% of the adjusted net income computed without regard to the
net operating loss deduction. The amendment is applicable only to divi-
dends received after August 31, 1950; if the amendment were made retro-
active to earlier open years, it would have caused considerable adminis-
trative confusion wholly disproportionate to abstract tax equity and in-
creased revenue. 20
The amendment was not designed to produce substantial additional
revenue21 but was occasioned chiefly by the need for removing, prospective-
ly, distortion in the logical pattern of dividends-received credit. It is sig-
nificant that the amendment does not, at least according to congressional
statement, 22 purport to affect the income tax consequences to the distrib-
uting corporation of a distribution in kind. Hence, there is still left for
further litigation, if the Treasury Department is so inclined, 23 the tax con-
sequences to the distributing corporation of distributions in kind which
have appreciated or declined in value between the date of original acquisition
and the date of distribution. That area may well be the subject of future
legislation.24
The limitation on the dividends-received credit for dividends in kind
now has excess profits tax consequences of no mean significance. Under
the new subchapter D of the Internal Revenue Code25 no part of a divi-
dend is subject to excess profits tax except the portion of the dividend
which is not eliminated from net income because of the application of the
limitation on the dividends-received credit to dividends in kind.26 Thus, if
20. In addition, there are always doubts as to constitnbiionalitv of retroactive increase of
tax burdens. But see Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); \Vscons;n v, Pennev. 311
U.S. 435 (1940): Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining & NIfe. Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940).
21. H.R. WAYS AND MEANS CoMM. REP. No. 2319. 81st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1950):
SEN. FIN. CoMM. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Both Committees rsti-
mated revenues wo,,ld be increased $6 million a year b% the amendment to Section 26(b).
22. See note 21 supra. If the dividend in kind has an adjusted basis to the distrib-
nting corporation in excess of its fair market value when received by the shareholder, the
credit cannot exceed 85% of such fair market value. l-.R. WAYS AND MFANS COMM.
RP. No. 2087. supra note 16 at p. 22.
23. Cf. Raum, Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Asbect, 63 I.IARv. L. Ruv. 593 (1950):
Tye, Corporate Distributions--Some Current Trends, 4 TAx L. REv. 459 (1949); Johnson,
Corporation and Stockholder-Dividends in Kind, 1 TAx L. REV. 86 (1945): Wallace.
Corporation and Stockholder-Dividends in Kind: A Dissent, 1 Tx L. RF.v. 93 (1945).
24. Present omens forbode no early legislative treatment.
25. Added by Section 101, Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950 and containing Sections
430 to 472 of the TNT. REv. ConE.
26. INT. REv. CODE § 433(a), dealing with excess profits net income of the taxable
year, reads in part as follows:
433. Excess Profits Net Income.
a) Taxable Years Ending After June 30, 1950-The excess profits net income
for any taxable year ending after June 30, 1950, shall be the normal-tax net income.
as defined in Section 13(a) (2), for such year increased or decreased by the follow-
ing adjustments:
(1) Adjustments.-
(a) Dividends received.-The credit for dividends received shall apply,
without limitation (except the limitation relating to dividends in kind), to all
dividends on stock of all corporations, except that no credit for dividends received
shall be allowed with respect to dividends (actual or constructive) on stock of
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after August 31, 1950, Corporation A were to receive a cash dividend of
$100, the entire amount would be eliminated from excess profits net income.
If, however, Corporation A were to receive a dividend in property (other
than cash) having a fair market value of $100 but having a basis to the
distributing corporation of only $80, $20 would be included in excess profits
net income and subject to excess profits tax. 2'
Although, as indicated above, for income tax purposes generally the
new limitation on the dividends-received credit is applicable only to divi-
dends received after August 31, 1950, that limitation has now been given
effect for excess profits tax purposes to the calendar years 1946 to 1949, in-
clusive. For corporations using the earnings credit in computing excess
profits tax liability, the rule described in the preceding paragraph applies
in determining the income of the taxable years in the base period, i.e., cal-
endar years 1946 to 1949 .2 Such a situation may result in substantial tax
savings, -9 especially where the taxpayer corporation, computing its excess
profits tax liability, may have received distributions in kind during the cal-
endar years 1946 to 1949 but not during a taxable year subject to excess
profits tax. It is only right, however, that if the limitation on the dividends-
received credit for dividends in kind is applicable to excess profits tax years,
it should be equally applicable in the base period years, even though in
particular cases fortuitous tax savings may accrueca°
foreign personal holding companies or dividends on stock which is not a capital
asset: .. ..
27. Official specific instructions prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
for filling out Schedule EP (Form 1120) in computation of Corporation Excess Profits
Tax reads in part as follows (Item 9, p. 3):
. . , 9. Dividends received.-The purpose of this adjustment is to exclude
dividends, except dividends (actual or constructive) on stock of foreign personal
holding companies and dividends on stock which is not a capital asset. In the case
of a dividend in kind, received after August 31, 1950, the amount to be excluded
shall not exceed the adjusted basis of the property so distributed in the hands of
the distributing corporation at the time of the distribution, increased in the amount
of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the distributing corporation
by reason of such distribution.
Under such instruction the amount excluded cannot exceed, in the example described
in the text, the adjusted basis of the dividend in kind, namely, $80.
28. Ir. REV. Coox § 433(G), dealing with earnings of taxable years in base period
for excess profits tax purposes, reads in part as follows:
t . . (b) Taxable Years in Base Period-or the purposes of computing
the average base period net income, the excess profits net income for an taxable
year shall be the normal-tax net income, as defined in Section 13(a) (2) as in
effect for such taxable year, increased or decreased by the following adiustments
(for additional adjustments in case of certain reorganizations, see part If of this
subchapter): . . .(6) Dividends received.-The credit for dividends received shall apply, with-
out limitation (except the limitation relating to dividends in kind), to all dividends
on stock of all corporations, except that no credit for dividends received shall be
allowed with respect to dividends (actual or constructive) on stock of foreign per-
sonal holding companies or dividends on stock which is not a capital asset; . . .
29. This possibility of tax saving was not present under World \\'ar II excess profits
tax. C. 2, Subchapter E, INT. REv. CoDE repealed by Section 122(a) of the Revenue Act
of 1945, Pub. L. No. 214, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 453.
30. Taxpayers, whose excess profits credit is computed on the invested capital method,




'hirty-one years ago in Eisner v. Macoynber,ai the Supreme Court of
tie United States held that Congress did not have power under the Six-
teenthl Amendment to tax as income a dividend in its own conmon stock
paid by Standard Oil Company of California on its own common stock-'
Congress was not slow in recognizing that unless there were a statutory bar.
such a stock dividend could be easily redeemced tax free into cash. The
Revenue Act of 1921 thus provided in substance that redemption of a stock
dividend might result in having the redemption proceeds taxed as a divi-
dend.3  Later, statutory successors of that provision (now embodied iii
Secton 115 (g) of tle lnternal Revenue Codej were broadened to cover all
redemptions whether or not the stock redeemed had originally been issued
as a stock dividend in wholc or in part.
During the past threc dccades there has been considerable litigation
on the extent to which Section 115(g) and its earlier counterparts are an
effective bar to the distribution of cash or the cquivalcnt of cash through
the redemption of stock free from tax as ordinary dividend income. From
time to time numcrous suggestions were heard for the amendment of Section
115(g) but none seemed to be appealing to the Congress until after the
1949 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Commissioner
31. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).32. Following the decision in Eisner v. Macornber, referred to in the text. CongrCss
specifically provided that a stock dividend should not be subject to income tax. That
prohibition persisted mtil 1936 when, by Section 115(f) of the Revenue Act of 1936.
it was provided that "A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in its stock
or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it
does not constitute income to the shareholders within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." Pub, ,. No. 740, 74th Cong. In i levering v. Grif
fiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943). the Supreme Court held that Section 115(f) of the Revenur
Act of 1936 did not in effect overrule Eisner v. Macomber but that, on the contrary, thl
legislative history surrounding the enactment of that section indicated the Congress still
thought a dividend, such as that issued in Eisner v. Macomber, should not be subject to
ax. See also, Helvering v. Sprouce, 318 U.S. 604 (1943), and Strassburger v. Comni'r.
318 U.S. 604 (1943), Section 115(f) of the INT. REV. Coox, a direct successor
of Section 115(f) of the Revenue Act of 1936, does not therefore atthorize the taxation
of so-called common on common stock dividends.
33. Section 201(d) of the Revenuc Act of 1921 provided that "A stock dividend
shall not be subiect to tax but if after the distribution of any such dividend the corpora-
tion proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such time and in such manner as to make
the distribution and cancellation or redemption essentially equivalent to the distribution
of a taxable dividend, the amount received in redemption or cancellation of the stock
shall be treated as a taxable dividend to the extent of the earnings or profits accumulated
by such corporation after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend."
34. "If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was
issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution
and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribu-
tion of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of
the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated
after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend." [NT. REV. Coonw§11(g)(1). Cutkin and Beck, Stock Redemptions as Taxable Events Under Section
115(g), 24 TAxEs 1172 (1946). Murphy, Partial Liquidations and the New Look. 5
T.Ax L. REv. 73 (1949); Miller, Stock Redempntions, PRocEEDINGs OF NEwv YORK
UNIVmiRSIY Sixtii ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 307 (1948); Drye, Earned
Surplus and Its Tax Problems for the Stockholder, 1 TAx L. REV. 421 (1949).
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v. Wanamaker.35 In that case the taxpayers (trustees of a testamentary
trust) owned stock in Corporation P which was the parent of a subsidiary
corporation, S. Corporation S bought P stock from the taxpayers during
the years 1942, 1943 and 1944. The Commissioner asserted that the pur-
chase of the P stock by S was tantamount to a redemption of the P stock
calling for the application of Section 115(g) of the Internal Revenue Code,
so that the proceeds should be taxed as a dividend. The Court of Appeals,
affirming the Tax Court, thought otherwise and held that Section l15(g)
was applicable only to the situation where a corporation redeems or cancels
its own stock and not the stock of any other company, irrespective of the
relationship of that company to the corporation acquiring the stock.3
Fully cognizant of the fact that to amend Section ll5(g) to bar aiy
further so-called Wanamaker redemptions would yield immediately only
insignificant additional revenue, 7 the Congress, in the Revenue Act of
1950, added a new subdivision (2) to Section 115(g) to prevent future
reliance on the Wanamaker decision. Effective as to taxable years ending
after August 31, 1950, and to amounts received after that date, redemption1
of stock through use of a subsidiary corporation may (but not necessarily)
result in the realization of ordinary dividend income, subject to progressive
surtax rates, as distinguished from either capital gain or capital loss. 35
The new provision is applicable if the corporation issuing the stock
has control of the corporation acquiring the stock. "Control" is defined as
ownership of stock possessing either at least 50% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or, in the alternative, at
least 50% of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of the acquiring
corporation.39 Inasmuch as "control" not only covers direct but indirect
ownership as well, the provision would be applicable, for example, where
Corporation X acquires shares of stock of Corporation Z and the latter owns
100% of the stock of Corporation IV, which in turn owns 50% of the
stock of Corporation X. The new provision, however, would not be ap-
plicable to the acquisition by Corporation R of stock of Corporation S
even though both are wholly owned subsidiaries of Corporation T.40
35. Comm'r v. Trustees, 178 F.2d 10 (3rd Cir. 1949), affirming 11 T.C. 365 (1948).
36. See Note, 63 HAxv. L. REv. 1275 (1950).
37. "Your Committee's amendment will yield a small amount of additional revenue,
and prevent substantial loss through the utilization of this loophole in future years.'
H.R, WAYS Arn MEANS COMM. Rap. N6. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1950); SEN.
FIN. Co sm. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong,, 2d Sess. 43 (1950).
38. Revenue Act of 1950, § 208. A distribution may be taxed as a dividend tinder
Section ll5(g) irrespective of whether the amount thereof is equal to, in excess of, or
less than the adjusted basis of the redeemed or cancelled stock.
39. Care must be taken to distinguish the concept of "control" under Section
115(g) (2) from the concept of "control" under Section 112(h). Aside from the differ-
ences in percentages of total combined voting power necessary, the former section has tlic
additional requirement of ownership of 50% of total value of shares whereas the latter
section requires 80% of the total number of shares of nonvoting stock.
40. There would seem to be little economic justification in many instances for dis-
tinguishing between the purchase of a parent corporation's stock by a subsidiary corpora-
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The new subdivision (2) of Section 115(g) does not automatically
come into play merely because a so-called "controlled" corporation acquires
the stock of the issuing corporation. The basic test is whether, if the
anount paid for the stock by the acquiring "controlled" corporation had
been distributed to the issuing corporation and that amount had in turn
been applied by the latter in redemption of the stock, such amount would,
under subdivision (1) of Section 115(g), be treated as essentially equivalent
to a taxable dividend. Thus, it is still necessary, even under the new pro-
vision, to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the acquisition
of stock whether a dividend had in fact been distributed. While plugging
a so-called loophole "discovered" as a result of the Wanarnaker decision,
or, at least, filling in a casus omissus, the new subdivision (2) will not
necessarily cut down the amount of litigation under Section 115(g) gener-
ally. That litigation will continue as long as there are differences in opinion
as to what constitutes, "in effect," a dividend. 41
While attempting to strengthen the effectiveness of Section 115(g)
through the addition of the new subdivision (2), the Congress, interest-
ingly enough, gave ear to representations that some relief from the impact
of the fundamental premise of Section 1l5(g) should be afforded in the
case of redemptions of stock to pay death taxes. Under a new subdivision
(3) of that section, 42 stock may now be redeemed automatically free from
tax on the proceeds as ordinary dividend income under all (but not less
than all) the conditions described presently.
The stock to be redeemed must be stock which is part of some de-
tion and the purchase by one corporation of stock of a so-called brother or sister corpora-
tion. In both situations the recipient of the redemption proceeds might be getting his
money out at capital gains rates which otherwise should be subjected to surtax rates.
The justifcation for the distinction, however, is real because in the paTent and subsdiary
situation the recipient shareholder could be deemed in effect to have received a dividend
from the parent bv means of a payment made on its behalf by the subsidiary. If, for
example, the subsidiary had distributed earnings to its parent and the parent had redeemed
its slock. Section 1 1 5(g), before amendment in 1950, might well have been considered
applicable; a so-called indirect payment by the parent through its subsidiary should logically,
therefore, not escape the impact of Section 1l5(g). 'Where, however, the purchasing
corporation is not a subsidiary of the corporation issuing the stock, there cannot be any
legal bass for attributing to the purchase proceeds the character of a dividend since in
fact neither corporation owes the duty to pay dividends to the other.
41. DeWind, Preferred Stock "Bail-Outs" and the Income Tax, 62 HAv. L. REv.
1126 (1950); Darrell, Recent Develotments in Nontaxahle Reorganizations and Stock
Dividends, 61 HARv. L. REv. 958 (1948).
42. As added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 209, effective as to taxable years ending
after September 22, 1950 but only to amounts distributed after that date:
. . . (3) Redemption of stock to pay death taxes-The provisons of this
subsection shall not apply to such part of any amount so distributed with respect
to stock the value of which is included in determining the value of the gross estate
of a decedent in accordance with section 811, as is distributed after such decedent's
death and within the period of limitations for the assessment of estate tax provided
in section 874(a) (determined without the application of section 875) or within
90 days after the expiration of such period, and as is not in excess of the estate,
inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes (including any interest collected as a part
of such taxes) imposed because of such decedent's death: Provided, that the value
of the stock in such corporation for estate tax purposes comprises more than 50
per centum of the value of the net estate of such decedent.
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cedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The value of the re-
deemed stock must be more than 50% of the value of the decedent's net
estate for similar purposes. Redemption proceeds must be actually distributed
after decedent's death 43 but, in any event, not later than three years and
ninety days from the actual filing (timely or otherwise) of the federal
estate tax return. 4 Tie amount of the redemption proceeds must not be
in excess of all federal, state, and foreign estate, inheritance, legacy and
succession taxes, including interest collected as part thereof, due and owing
by virtue of the decedent's death. 45
In many respects the new subdivision (3) is a curious provision. The
stock to be redeemed need not be part of the estate of the decedent which
comes into the hands of the executor or administrator as property owned by
the decedent at his death. For federal estate tax purposes, property may be
included in the gross estate of a decedent for reasons other than outright
ownership, such as, for example, property transferred in contemplation of
death, property as to which possession or enjoyment thereof is delayed un-
til the decedent's death 4 and property transferred, subject to rights of revo-
cation, amendments and alterations by the decedent.4 7 Furthermore, the
new subdivision (3) may afford relief if the stock, owned outright at date of
death by the decedent, was distributed in due course to legatees prior to
redemption. It is apparent, however, that the section will not apply if the
person redeeming the stock is a bona fide purchaser for value, notwith-
standing that because of a prior transfer the stock is included in the gross
estate of a decedent. 48
Although the title of subdivision (3)-"Redemption of Stock to Pay
Taxes"-implies a suggestion that the subdivision covers only situations
where redemption occurs for the purpose of paying death taxes, nowhere
in that subdivision is there any requirement that the proceeds of the re-
43. Subdivision (3) of Section 115(g) would be applicable even though the cor-
poration effecting the redemption carried on negotiations with the owner of the stocc
prior to the death of the individual in whose gross estate the stock is included. As stated
in the text, the test is the actual date of the payment of the redemption proceeds.
44. Section 276 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the execution of waivers
of the period of limitation on assessment of income tax. There is no comparable provision
for waivers in federal estate tax cases. Section 875 of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides, however, for the suspension of the running of the statute of limitation on assess-
ment of estate tax where a deficiency notice has been sent. The three years and ninety
day period described in the text is unaffected by any suspension of statute of limitations
occurring under Section 875.
45. If the redemption proceeds are in excess of all death taxes described in the text,
the benefits of Section 115(g) (3) are inapplicable only to such excess. I.R. WAYs AND
MEANS COMm. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1950); SEN. F N. COMM. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1950).
46. INT. REv. CODE § 811(c).
47. Id. at § 811(d).
48. There would seem to be no justification for extending the benefits to redemp-
tioa proceeds received by a bona fide purchaser of stock included in some decedent's gross
estate. SEN. FIN. COMm. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1950).
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demption need be actually utilized for payment of any such taxes. 9  As a
corollary, it follows that likewise there is no requirement that the estate
of the decedent or anyone else be in need of cash. Assume, for example, all
death taxes to have been paid out of ample liquid funds. Later, and within
three years and ninety days from the filing of the federal estate tax return,
stock is redeemed by a person to whom the property had been transferred
in contemplation of death six months prior to decedent's death. The new
amendment would be applicable (assuming, of course, the value of that
stock is included in the gross estate), even though the owner of the stock
did not in fact contribute to the payment of any part of the death taxes
because of a provision in the decedent's will having the effect of absolving
the stock owner from contribution for any part of the death taxes.
The foregoing requirements of subdivison (3), relating to time of re-
demption, amount of redemption and value of stock redeemed, are specific
and unequivocal. Consequently, because the value of the decedent's gross
estate may be the subject of litigation extending over many years and the
value of the stock to be redeemed may also be in question, considerable
uncertainty can well develop as to whether redemption proceeds will ulti-
mately be "protected" under subdivision (3). As previously indicated, for
example, the value of the stock redeemed must be more than 50% of the
net estate,50 but that does not mean, of course, that the person owning such
stock is necessarily in control, actual or otherwise, of the corporation"
which redeems such stock. Hence, absent such control, redemption may
be forced upon the stock owner when lie is at least not certain that he wants
the proceeds because of the inapplicability of subdivision (3). Where, how-
ever, for example, the estate is the stock owner and is in control of the re-
deeming corporation, great responsibility is placed on the executor whether
or not to redeem during the course of litigation extending beyond three
years and ninety days from the filing of the federal estate tax return. It is
natural, ordinarily, for the fiduciary to contend for as low a value as possible
in death tax proceedings. To be successful in such a case might mean that
the advantages of subd;vlsiou (3) of Section 1 l5(g) would be forfeited.5 L-
49. The title of new subdivision (3) is in a sense merely generally descriptive of the
ptirposes of the subdivision but it is not legally controlling in so far as the subdivision
itself, aside from the title, covers situations where the redemption proceeds are not used
to pay death taxes.
50. '['here is some question as to what was meant by "net estate" in subdivision (3).
For purposes of the basic estate tax, the net estate is determined in part by deducting
from the vale of the gross estate an exemption of $100,000. INT. Rav. Cons § 812(a).
For purposes of additional estate tax, the exemption is $60,000. TNT. REv. Cona § 935(c).
It would appear that the net estate under subdivision (3) of Section 115(g) refers to
the net estate as determined for additional estate tax purposes. In any event, the marital
deduction, provided for by Section 812(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, would be taken
into account in determining the net estate.
51. The corporation referred to in the text would include a subsidiary corporation
described in subdivision (2) of Section 115(g).
52. Subdivision (3) normally will apply in so-called close family corporations. If :i
person other than the decedent's estate is the recipient of the redemption proceeds and
such person does not control the estate, the success of the fiduciary in obtaining a lo%%
PAYMENTS TO STOCKHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES 417
Subdivision (3) of Section 115(g) should itself be the subject of com-
paratively little litigation.53 Its effect on the overall interpretation of Sec-
tion llS(g) (1) may, however, give rise to litigation involving any redemp-
tion of stock (which is included in some decedent's gross estate) that does
not technically qualify under subdivision (3). On the one hand, it may
be argued that inasmuch as Congress specifically dealt with redemption of
stock included in some decedent's gross estate, any such case not technically
falling within subdivision (3) should automatically come within sub-
division (1). In opposition to such a contention, it may be argued that
subdivision (3) merely removes beyond the pale of contention the cases
falling within its scope and that the taxability of any redemption of stock
included in some decedent's gross estate, not coming with subdivision (3),
must be construed as if subdivision (3) had never been enacted. What
the trend of future litigation will be is difficult to tell but it is believed
that the latter view will ultimately prevail.
Collapsible Corporations
The treatment of corporate distributions was subjected in the Revenue
Act of 1950 to a radical change in the case of sales and liquidations effected
for tax purposes primarily. For some time prior to 1950, the Congress was
made aware that, notably in the movie and building construction industries,
one or more persons would organize a corporation for the production, con-
struction or manufacture of property and before such corporation would
normally realize any significant amount of income from such production,
construction or manufacture it would be liquidated and the property dis-
tributed to shareholders. The purpose was, of course, to "set the stage"
for the argument that any gain realized on the disposition of such property
should be capital gain.54 The disparity between the capital-gain rate (i.e.,
maximum of 25%) and high surtax rates made such a technique, if success-
ful, most inviting and attractivePr'  To meet that problem for the future
(but necessarily to preclude disposition of issues for earlier years),"6 Con-
gress added a new subsection (in) to Section 11767 which has the effect of
transforming any gain, otherwise long-term, realized from the sale or ex-
change-in liquidation or otherwise-of stock of a so-called "collapsible"
valuation may also destroy the effectiveness of subdivision (3) for such person. This is
but another instance of the peculiar manner in which subdivision (3) may operate.
53. The observation in the text is made with full realization that prognostication in
this field is dangerous.
54. I'Nr. RFv. CoDE § 115 (c).
55. Blum, The Decline and Fall of Capital Gains, 28 TAXES 838: Miller. The "Cat.
ital Asset Concept": Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.f. 837, 882 (1950).
56. H.R. AVYs AND MEVIANS CoMro. Rup. No, 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 'Th
1950); SEN. FIN. Comm. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 88 (1950). Revenue
ct of 1950, § 212(b), specifically provides that determination of tax treatment of an;
Rains realized before 1950 is to be made if Section 117(m) had not been added to the
Code and without any inferences that the addition of that section was not expressly made
applicable to pre-1950 gains and without inferences drawn from the specific limitations
contained in Section 117(m). To what extent this legislative mandate will be observed
will never be known.
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corporation into ordinary income, subject to the full impact of surtax rates.
A "collapsible" corporation is in substance defined as a corporation
which is formed or availed of principally for the production, construction
or manufacture of property or for the holding of stock in a corporation so
formed or availed of "with a view" to the following two purposes: First,
a sale or exchange of stock of such corporation by its shareholders or a dis-
tribution to such shareholders before (not after) the realization by such
corporation of a substantial part of the net income to be derived from such
property and, second, the ultimate realization by the shareholders of gain
which is "attributable" to such property.
Notwithstanding the existence of both proscribed purposes, the special
treatment under Section 117(m) of gain realized by a shareholder on his
stock in a "collapsible" corporation does not apply if any one of the three
following limitations is not met: if, after commencement of the manu-
facture, construction or production of property, the shareholder did not
own, actually or constructively, more than 10% in value of the outstanding
stock of the "collapsible" corporation; if not more than 70% of the gain
recognized in the taxable year is attributable to the property manufactured,
constructed or produced; and if the gain is realized more than three years
following the completioni of such manufacture, construction or production
of property.
Section 117(tnf) abounds with latent, as well as patent, ambiguities.
Space does not permit an extended analysis of such ambiguities, but it is
obvious that for some time to come there will be considerable opportunities
for extended litigation. Among the more important difficulties in Section
117(m) is the problem of whether a subjective or objective test is to be
applied in determining when a corporation is "formed or availed"' , of "with
a view"59 to the proscribed purposes. In this connection, whether the cor-
poration was formed before or after the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1950 might have a factual (as distinguished from a legal) bearing on assumed
motive. Furthermore, how many stockholders must have participated in
formulating the proscribed purposes is a troublesome uncertainty. Who
can say whcn a corporation has engaged in the manufacture, construction
or production of property "to alny extent" as set forth in the statute? Also,
there is the substantial necessity of determining when gain realized by the
57. Revenue Act of 1950, § 212, effective for taxable years ending after December
31, 1949, with respect to gain realized after that date. Consequently, the collapsible cot-
poration treatment is applicable to corporations formed either before or after January 1.1950.58. rhe experience gained under Section 102 of the Code, relating to surtax on cor-
porations formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing surtax on shareholders, may
be of value in the construction of the "formed or availed of" test in the new Section
117(m).
59. Presumably, the words "with a view" imply a test in which an important, but
not necessarily primary, purpose is to anticipate gain by shareholders before realization
of income by the corporation. To what extent any such anticipation will be treated as
de minimis remains to be seen.
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shareholders is in fact attributable to the property manufactured, constructed
or produced by the so-called "collapsible" corporation,60
Section 117(m), like Sections 26(b) and 1 15(g) (2), was not enacted
for the revenue it would produce.6' It was brought into the law to preserve
the logical effectiveness of progressive surtax rates. If it acts as a deterrent
to easy avoidance of such rates, it will have justified its existence. If, how-
ever, because of the numerous troublesome areas which might conceivably
restrain orderly liquidations-not primarily connected with tax-saving motives
-one may question the ultimate utility of such legislative prohibitions,
especially in view of the relatively insignificant expected revenue yield.
Section 112(b) (7) Liquidations
The Revenue Act of 1950 revived for the calendar year 1951 an oppor-
tunity to effect a complete cancellation or redemption of all the stock of a
corporation without the recognition of gain."-" That substantial tax privilege
is limited to complete liquidations fitting the conditions set forth in Section
112(b) (7) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 1938,03 and again in 1944,4
Congress was impressed with the argument that many personal holding
companies, whose existence was no longer justified, could not completely
liquidate without substantial tax liability incurred by their stockholders be-
cause of appreciation in the values of. the corporate assets.
To accelerate and induce the liquidation of such companies in the
years mentioned, Congress provided roughly that corporations, whose share-
holders elect to have Section 112(b) (7) applyt- could liquidate with the
following tax consequence to sharcholdcrs generally. In the case of non-
corporate shareholders, gain, not in excess of their ratable share of earnings
and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, would be treated as a
60. An interesting facet of the difficulties involved in determining when gain is
attributable to property is illustrated by the following situation. Assume that a mortgage
has been obtained for building construction under Section 608 of the National Housing
Act, c. 319, 56 STAT. 303 (1942), 59 STAT. 47 (1945), 60 SFrAr. 214 (1946), 12
U.S.C. § 1743. Prior to realization of substantial income by the corporation obtaining
the mortgage and constructing the housing development either a liquidation occurs or
shareholders sell their stock. is any gain which they may realize in whole or in part
attributable to the construction or to the mortgage, especially if the mortgage should be
a favorable one? At present, the answer is in doubt.
61. Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee estimated that the "closing of the collapsible corporation loophole" would produce
about $3,000,000 additional revenue each year. H.R. WAYS AND Mr-4Ns Comm. REP.
No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1950); SEN. FIN. Commt. RE'. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 46 (1950).
62. Revenue Act of 1950, § 206.
63. Revenue Act of 1938, § 1 2 (g) (7), Pub. L. No. 554, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.
§ 289. The transfer of all property under the liquidation had to occur within Decem-
ber, 1938.
64. Revenue Act of 1943, § 120, Pub. L. No. 235, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. § 63. The
transfer of all property under the liquidation had to be within any one calendar month
of 1944. Delivery of more than 94% in book value of the assets during the month
picked by the shareholders for complete liquidation has been held to be compliance with
Section 112(b) (7) of the Code, as amended by Section 120 of the 1943 Act. Estate of
Lewis B. Meyer v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 109 (1950).
65. The Tax Court has held that an election inade under Section 112(b) (7) is
binding. Estate of Lewis B. Meyer, suora note 64.
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dividend; gain attributable to the receipt of money or recently acquired
stock or securities would be taxed as capital gain; no part of the gain other-
wise realized on the liquidation would be taxed but, subject to adjustments,
the basis of the assets acquired on liquidation would be the basis of the
stock cancelled or redeemed. In the case of corporate shareholders, gain
would be recognized only to the extent of the greater of (a) the portion
of the assets received consisting of moncy or of property recently acquired,
or (b) ratable share of earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913.
The operation of Section 112(b) (7), under the amendment made by
the Revenue Act of 1950, is limited to liquidations adopted after December
31, 1950, and if the transfer of all property under the liquidation occurs
within some one calendar month of 1951. That section is not limited, how-
ever, to liquidations of personal holding companies. Any domestic corpora-
tion can be liquidated thereunder/"
The importance of Section l12(b) (7) in the present discussion lies
chiefly in its relevance to the operation of Section 117(7), dealing with the
treatment of gain received from so-called "collapsible corporations." If a
1951 liquidation falls within the scope of Section 171(in) and also qualifies
as a Section 112(b) (7) liquidation, which of the two sections will govern
the treatment of gain to the recipicnt shareholders? There is nothing in the
statute nor in legislative history generally which gives the basis for an un-
equivocal and categorical reply to such an inquiry. Each section relates to
a special type of liquidation transaction, so that the usual rule that a special
treatment takes precedence over a general treatment does not obtain here.
Analysis of each section reveals, however, that, in a sense, Section 117 merely
transmutes what would otherwise have been capital gain into ordinary
income, but the basis of the property received is no different in the hands
of the recipient stockholder from what it would have been had there been
no such transmutation. On the other hand, he who obtains the benefit of
a Section 112(b) (7) liquidation must pay a price for the present non-
recognition of gain, otherwise taxable, through the use of a substituted
basis of the assets received on liquidation. It would seem entirely logical,
therefore, that for the year 1951 a Section 112(b) (7) transaction, otherwise
66. Since 1934 so-called personal holding companies have been subject to addi-
tional surtax on undistributed earnings, See Revenue Act of 1934, § 351, Pub. L. No. 216,
73rd Cong., INT. REV. CODE § 500. Consequently, except in unusual situations per-
sonal holding companies, at least those organized since 1934, have had no appreciable
accumulation of earnings and profits. Liquidation under Section 112(b) (7) would, in
the case of such companies, therefore, generally result in little income being treated as
ordinary dividend income, except possibly as to so-called recently acquired assets of the
corporation. In the case of corporations other than personal holding companies which,
despite the prohibition against unreasonable accumulation of surplus, have managed to
retain substantial accumulated earnings and profits, there would be less impetus for utili-
zation of Section 112(b) (7). Whether or not the shareholders should consent to a
liquidation under Section l12(b) (7) will, of course, depend upon individual circum-
stances, The election is, as previously indicated, a solemn one, not subject to revocation.
Goldman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo No. 2205, October 25, 1950, 9 T.C.M. 936.
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falling within the scope of Section 117(m), will nevertheless be governed by
the terms of the former rather than by the latter section.
If Congress should at a later date again revive Section 112(b) (7), it
may well at that time take into account the effect of such revival on the
effectiveness of Section 117(m). In the absence, however, of the incorpora-
tion of Section 112(b)(7) as a permanent feature of the federal income
tax law, the effectiveness of Section 117(m), such as it may be is not ma-
terially weakened by the preference given over it to Section 112(b) (7)
transactions.
I. STOCK OPTIONS
After nearly four decades of federal income tax administration, Con-
gress moved, in the Revenue Act of 1950,11 to legislate specifically on the
tax aspects of certain employee stock options. Prior to that legislative move,
the tax consequences of stock options were a matter exclusively for admin-
istrative and judicial interpretations under the so-called "bargain purchase"
theor),. 8  Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Smith,"" the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his
regulations provided in substance that every so-called "bargain purchase"
made (including exercise of stock options) by an employee resulted in com-
pensation to him to the extent of the bargain.7 0  In the unenacted Revenue
Revision Bill of 19487' which passed the House of Representatives, specific
treatment was provided for so-called "restricted stock options."2 The
House of Representatives, when considering the bill which ultimately became
the Revenue Act of 1950, did not see fit to restore to active consideration
the matter of a legislative pattern for the treatment taxxvisc of employee
stock options. The Senate revived legislative interest on the subject.73
Whether the fundamental tax philosophy, such as can be discerned,
underlying the new employee stock option provisions is sound is beyond
the scope of this paper.74  The purpose here is merely to summarize the
principal aspects of the new stock option treatment for whatever use may
be made of it in future employee-employer relationships.
Section 130A of the Code purports to set forth specific rules covering
the inconc tax aspects of so-called "restricted stock options."7 , In order
67. INT. REV. CODE § 1 30A as amended by Section 218 of the Revenue Act of 1950.
68. See for comprehensive list of literature in this field. Alexander, Employee Stock
Opttions and the 1950 Revenue Act, 6 TAx L. Re.v. 165, 167, n.10 (1951).
69. 324 U.S. 177 (1945); rehearing denied 324 U.S. 695 (1945).
70. U.S. Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.22(a)-I, as amended by T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum.
BULL. 18; I.T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 15.
71. H.R. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
72. Section 137 of M-R. 6712 supra.
73. The details in Section 130 of .IR. 6712 suitra, differ materially in many respects
from Section 1 30A of the Code, as amended by Section 218 of the Rcvetne Act of 1950,
but the basic mold appeared first in H.R. 6712.
74. For a criticism of the provision as giving unwarranted relief to corporation exec-
ultives, see Lyon, Employee Stock Options under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 Cor.. L.
REv. 1, 52-58 (1951).
75. These rules are effectvie only for taxable years ending after December 31, 1949,
where the exercise of the option occurs after 1949.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
that the section be applicable, the option must not only be a restricted stock
option as defined but the stock acquired by virtue of the exercise of the
option must not be disposed of within two years after the option was granted
nor within six nionths following acquisition of the stock. There is nothing
in Section 130A which provides any rules covering the tax consequences for
any taxable periods of: stock options which do not qualify as restricted
stock options; so-called restricted stock options exercised prior to 1950;
so-called restricted stock options where disposition of the stock acquired as
a result of the exercise of the option occurs within the two-year and six-
months' periods mentioned above; and any so-called restricted stock options
exercised by one who, at the time of the exercise of the option, is not (or
was not within three months prior thereto) an employee of the corporation
granting the option or of a parent or subsidiary corporation. 70
The entire field of the taxation of employee stock options which, for
one reason or another, do not come within the provisions of Section 130A is
still left open for further administrative and judicial development."
Preliminary Definitions
There are five tests78 which must be met in their entirety before an
option is a restricted stock option within the meaning of Section 130A. First,
the option must have been granted after February 26, 1945, the date Com-
missioner v. Smith, supra, was decided, to an individual "for any reason
connected with his employment by a corporatiofi" by either his employer or
by its parent or subsidiary corporation; second, only stock of the employer
or of its parent or subsidiary corporation must be covered by the option;
third, the option price cannot be lcss than 85% of the fair market value of
the stock subject to the option at the time the option is granted; fourth
the option must specifically provide that it cannot be transferable otherwise
than by will or by intestacy and is not exercisable during the lifetime of
the employee by him alone; and fifth, when the option is granted, the em-
ployee cannot own more than 10% of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock of his employer corporation or of its parent or subsidiary
corporation."
76. Corporate relationship is predicated on ownership of 50% of total combined
Voting power. INT. REV. CODE § 130A(d) (2) & (3). The 50% ownership test is
applied as of the time the option was granted.
77. It is interesting to note what the Senate Finance Committee thought of the
Commissioner's interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Comm'r v. Smith, 324
U.S. 177 (1945). "At the present time the taxation of these options is governed by
regulations which impede the use of the employee stock option for incentive purposes.
Moreover, your Committee believes these regulations go beyond the decision of the Supreme
Court in Comm'r v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945)." S N. F N. CoiM. REp. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950).
78. INT. REV. CODE § 130A(d) (1).
79. Ownership by the employee includes ownership of stock, directly or indirectly,
by brothers and sisters (of the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors and lineal descend-
ants. Furthermore, stock owner directly or indirectly by or for a corporation, partner-
ship, estate or trust must be considered as being proportionately owner for its shareholders,
partners or beneficiaries. 14-r. REV. CoDE § 130A(d) (1) (C).
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In determining whether an option qualifies as a restricted stock option,
modification, extension or renewal must be considered.80 Modification, ex-
tension or renewal will, in effect, be considered as the granting of a new
option. Thus, because of modification, extension or renewal, an option may
become a restricted stock option or, because thereof, an option may cease
being a restricted stock option. 1
If an employee exercises a restricted stock option and exchanges the
stock received on the exercise for other stock or securities in a tax-free ex-
change under either Section 112(b) (2) or Section 112(b) (3) of the Code
or if stock is received as a nontaxable dividend on the option stock under
Section 113(a) (19) of the Code, the stock or securities acquired in the
tax-free exchange or the dividend stock is to be treated as having been trans-
ferred to the employee upon exercise of the option. A similar rule is ap-
plicable where there are two or more such exchanges or acquisitions.82
Tax Consequences on Exercise of Option
Where the option price is 95% or more of the value of stock at the
time the option is granted, the employee will not be deemed to realize in-
come on the happening of any of the following events: The grant of the
option, the exercise of the option,83 or receipt of stock following exercise
of the option.84 If, however, the employee makes a disposition 5 of the
stock within two years from the date the option was granted to him or
within six months after he received the stock, Section 130A will not be
deemed applicable. If stock acquired on exercise of an option is held for
the requisite time, then gain or loss on a subsequent sale or exchange will
be treated as long-term gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset.9 6
Section 130A is applicable if, at the time the option is granted, the
optionee is an employee and at the time he exercised the option he was an
employee or had been an employee not more than three months before
such exercise. 7 There does not appear to be any requirement that the
80. hNT. REV. CODE § 130A(e).
81. Fair market value of the stock at the time of the grant of the option will be
deemed to be the highest of the following three values: (1) fair market value on date
of original grant; (2) fair market value on date of modification, extension or renewal;
and (3) fair market value on date of making any intervening modification, extension or
renewal.
82. TNT. REV, CODE § 130A(c).
83. This is in contrast to the rule under existing regulations of the Commissioner with
respect to stock options generally. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-1.
84. SEN. Fw. COMM. Rzp. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1950).
85. The term "disposition" includes a sale, exchange or gift or any transfer of legal
title; it does not include the passage of title from a deceased employee to his estate or by
bequest or inheritance; nor does it cover a tax-free exchange under Sections 112(b) (2)
and (3) of the Internal Revenue Code or a mere pledge of hypothecation. Nt. Rvv.
CODE § 130A(d) (4).
86. It is clear that no income tax liability would arise should the employee transfer
the stock as a gift more than two years from the date the option was granted and more
than six months after receipt of the stock. A gift within any one of those periods would,
of course, make Section 130A inapplicable.
87. TNT. REV. COPE § 130(A) (a).
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optionee must have remained an employee continuously in the period inter-
vening between grant of the option and exercise thereof, as long as the
three months' rule is observed. Once the option has been exercised, con-
tinued employment is, of course, not necessary.88
The statute is silent on the specific question as to whether the new
treatment would be applicable in the event an employee were to die before
exercising an option previously granted to him. Although there seems to
be some difference of opiniou,8 the unequivocal wording of the statute
would appear to require a conclusion that only the employee-optionee can
exercise the option. Certainly, where an cmployee dies after having exer-
cised an option, Section I30A will govern if the fiduciary representative
should retain the stock beyond the expiration of both the two-year period
following grant of the option and the six months' period following receipt
of the stock. There would appear to be not inconsiderable question as to
the applicability of Section 130A if such representative were to dispose of
the stock before the expiration of either of such periods.9 0
What has been said above with respect to the tax consequences on the
grant and exercise of the option is equally applicable to the case where the
option price is less than 95% of the value of stock at the time the option
was granted. The same comment applies in case of termination of employ-
ment. The differences in treatment lie in disposition and on death of the
employee.
Where the option price is between 85% and 95% and disposition of
the stock is postponed until after the two-year and six-months' periods, re-
spectively, the following rule is applicable. For the taxable year in which
the disposition occurs, the employee's gross income is increased by inclusion
as compensation (taxed as ordinary income and not as capital gain) of an
amount which is equal to the excess (a) of the fair market value of the
stock at the time of disposition over the option price, or (b) of the fair
market value of the stock on date the option was granted over the option
price, whichever yields the lesser amount.' Upon the occurrence of a dis-
position and realization of compensation, the cost basis of the stock to the
employee at that time must be increased by the amount of compensation
included in gross income. Thus, any amount received on sale or exchange
in excess of the cost basis so adjusted is treated as a long-term capital gain.
88. The extent of the employee's stock ownership after granting of the option is
immaterial; similarly, extent of stock ownership of the employee on exercise of the option
or thereafter is irrelevant to the application of Section 130A.
89. That Section 130A is inapplicable, see Alexander, op. cit. s pra note 68 at
204; that Section 130A should be applicable, see LYoN, op. cit. supra note 74 at
48-52.
90. Cost basis of the stock in the hands of the executor or beneficiary, regardless of
the application of Secdon 130A, will be fair market value of stock at the employee's
death or, in the case of the optional value for estate tax purposes, one year after death or
on earlier disposition. INT. REV. CODE § 113(a) (5).
91. For example, see CoNERENCE Comm. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
30-31 (1950).
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If the excess amount received on sale or exchange is less than the option
price, the difference is treated as a long-term capital loss.
In the case of the death of an employee who had received and exer-
cised an option in the so-called 85% to 95% class, the statute requires the
following treatment on disposition of the stock? 2 In the final income tax
return of the decedent, there is to be reported as compensation and not as
capital gain an amount equal to the excess (a) of fair market value of the
stock at death over the option price, or (b) of fair market value of the stock
at the time the option was granted over the option price, whichever yields
the smaller amount. This is so regardless of when death occurs, i.e., whether
or not within two years from the date the option was granted or within
six months following acquisition of the stock.lu
In the case of employee stock options not governed by Section 130A,
the employee may be subjected to heavy income tax on the mere exercise
of an option? 4 At the same time, however, his corporate employer is per-
mitted to obtain a deduction under Section 2 3(a) for compensation paid
to the extent such compensation is includable in the employee's gross income.
Inasmuch as, for purposes of Section 130A. Congress deemed restricted stock
options not to be compensatory but incentive devices, it was only natural
that, to the extent the tax consequences of an option are governed by Sec-
tion I30A, no deduction will be allowed to any corporation.D
Where the corporate employer grants an option, qualified as a re-
stricted stock option, to only a few employees, it should not normally be
difficult for the employer corporation to keep informed as to whether dis-
position of the stock was postponed beyond the required holding periods.
If, however, a large corporate employer should grant such options to many
employees, it is possible that in some instances the employer will lose
valuable tax deductions, through ignorance of what employees have been
doing with their stock. Although there seems to have been considerable
activity among larger corporations to grant restricted stock options to top
management since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950, the question
whether any particular corporation should grant such an option is, of course,
one which is grounded in corporate policy beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion. Stockholder resistance to the grants of any such options cannot, of
course, be overlooked.
92, If the employee dies before having exercised the stock option, then what has
been said previously in the text applies here.
93. Cost basis of the stock to the fiduciary or beneficiary is the same as that set
forth above in the text, regardless of the amount included as corhpensation in the deced-
ent's final income tax return.
94. The Commissioner has not yet undertaken to tax as income any so-called spread
between fair market value and option price at the time the option is granted.
95. INT. REv. CODE § 130A(a) (2).
